Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Scrutinizing the 737 MAX After Fatal Crashes

The crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 within five months of each other cast a dark shadow over Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft. Combined, the accidents resulted in 346 lives lost, leading aviation authorities around the world to ground the entire 737 MAX fleet pending investigations. For Boeing, scrutiny of the 737 MAX is essential to restore confidence in what was intended to be a fuel-efficient workhorse for airlines worldwide.

At the crux of the scrutiny are questions around the 737 MAX's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), an automated safety feature new to the MAX that adjusts the horizontal stabilizer to prevent stalls. On both doomed flights, erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) readings triggered MCAS to repeatedly push the nose down, despite pilots' efforts to correct it. Boeing made the decision to add MCAS to the MAX without detailing it in manuals or training requirements, leaving pilots unaware of how to respond.

Investigations have shed light on other factors potentially contributing to the crashes, like maintenance issues and lapses in crew coordination. But the role of MCAS in the tragedies sparked deep concerns about the increased automation in modern aircraft and whether pilots are sufficiently trained to intervene. It also raised questions around Boeing's cozy relationship with FAA regulators who certified the 737 MAX and the shortcomings of delegating so much approval authority.

For Boeing, understanding where oversight failed is critical. An internal review panel was assembled to examine development processes and suggest improvements, while external oversight groups scrutinized Boeing's safety culture. Issues like undue pressure on employees and schedule-driven priorities were identified as areas for improvement. Such findings will inform how Boeing improves design, training, and certification processes going forward.

While investigations helped reconstruct the crashes, simulators recreating MCAS scenarios shed light on how pilots could respond differently. Findings led Boeing to develop enhanced training materials and propose requiring all MAX pilots to complete simulator sessions before recertification. Boeing is also reassessing cockpit alerts and developing a software fix to rely on inputs from both AOA sensors, not just one.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Implementing New Pilot Training Requirements

Ensuring pilots are prepared to handle the 737 MAX's automated systems is paramount to restoring confidence. While Boeing maintains the MCAS system wasn't flawed, the crashes exposed gaps in pilot knowledge that likely contributed. Implementing more rigorous, mandatory MAX training protocols prior to recertification will help guarantee pilots fully understand the aircraft’s automation.

For many 737 pilots, the MAX represented “just another 737 version.” Boeing sold it as having minimal differences requiring no additional training. But the MCAS introduced new complexities these seasoned pilots weren’t aware of. The system could aggressively push the nose down in a way pilots found difficult to correct when relying on memory and instinct.

Updated training materials will educate pilots on MCAS and appropriate responses. Proposed mandates also require hands-on learning in MAX simulators to practice emergency procedures related to MCAS failure. This will allow pilots to experience how the system behaves and override it using electric stabilizer trim switches.Simulator training also prepares pilots for the higher nose-down authority of the MAX's larger engines compared to NG models.

Critics argue Boeing downplayed MCAS significance to sell the MAX as just another 737, avoiding costly simulator training requirements. But enabling pilots to practice crisis scenarios in a simulator will build muscle memory should issues arise in flight. Licensing agencies seem to agree—new mandates make simulator sessions a prerequisite for current 737 pilots before operating the MAX.

For airlines lacking MAX simulators, practical solutions are needed to avoid operational disruptions when the jet returns. Boeing has deployed MAX simulators to airline hubs worldwide and partnered with simulator manufacturers to expand access. Despite delays and expenses, airlines seem willing to go beyond minimum requirements, with many planning additional simulator sessions.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Installing Additional Warning Sensors and Alerts

Ensuring pilots receive accurate and abundant cues to potential problems is another key step for Boeing to rebuild trust in the 737 MAX. While the original MCAS design relied on input from just one of two Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors, proposed upgrades will tap both, providing pilots redundancy. Installing an additional AOA indicator and adding more cockpit alerts also aim to give pilots greater situational awareness.

Hand-flying a jetliner using stick and rudder is increasingly rare with today’s sophisticated autopilots. But when automation behaves unpredictably, pilots must take manual control. To do so effectively requires clear indications of what’s happening. The 737 MAX crashes revealed the hazards of pilots lacking cues to automation failures.

With MCAS relying on one AOA sensor, a single faulty reading could continuously trigger the system without the pilots understanding why. “We thought it was a runaway stabilizer trim,” said one pilot whose crew faced MCAS-induced struggles. With ambiguity around the cause, correcting the issue proved difficult.

Had MCAS received input from both AOA sensors, it could have disregarded a reading that didn’t match the other, avoiding activation. If readings had disagreed, that very split could have cued pilots to a sensor failure. Boeing now proposes using both AOA inputs for MCAS, providing pilots redundancy that was tragically missing.

Additional cockpit alerts and displays will also help pilots stay ahead of developing issues. One enhancement under consideration is activating the “stick shaker” stall warning earlier as MCAS engages. The jolting alert of the shaker helps grab attention, informing pilots the system sees an impending stall.

Other possible alerts include a “claacker” sounding if airspeed drops too low. A “MAX” light could also indicate when MCAS switches are needed to deactivate the system. Such clear cues help pilots recognize malfunctions early when easier to manage.

Finally, installing an AOA disagree light on all aircraft (not just optional add-ons) would quickly flag sensor issues. "We figured out that we could stop the trim from running away by pulling the throttle to idle,” said one pilot who faced MCAS activation. “But if we had known it was an AOA problem, we would have immediately known how to respond.”

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Reviewing Aircraft Design and Certification Processes

Scrutinizing how aircraft are designed and approved is instrumental for Boeing to restore confidence after the 737 MAX tragedies. While the crashes exposed issues with MCAS automation, they also raised concerns about the regulatory process that certified the aircraft as safe. Reviewing these processes aims to address oversight gaps and prevent history from repeating.

The 737 MAX was certified as a derivative model not needing extensive new evaluation. This allowed Boeing to develop and market the jet faster, touting its similarities to older 737s and downplaying changes. But the MAX introduced modifications like larger engines, altered aerodynamics, and MCAS automation—factors potentially warranting a fresh design review.

In hindsight, critics say classifying the MAX as just another 737 version was misleading. One pilot stated, “It was like buying a car listed as a 2020 model, then having the dealer deliver a ‘68 Camaro with a fresh coat of paint.” Had the MAX undergone recertification as a new aircraft type, scrutiny of its design and systems—including MCAS—may have been more rigorous.

Delegating so much authority to Boeing in approving its own aircraft has also been questioned. While the FAA still conducted oversight, bandwidth limitations required Boeing engineers to self-certify much of the MAX’s compliance. Some insiders say production pressures and design flaws were downplayed during this process.

Addressing these oversight gaps is key. Suggested changes include earlier and more detailed FAA involvement when introducing new technology on derivative models. More intensive flight testing to probe aircraft behavior in unusual scenarios is also proposed. There are calls for an impartial third-party review board to scrutinize automated tools like MCAS before certification.

Such measures aim to avoid repeats of the purported issues where designs were rushed or inadequate testing failed to uncover risks. They also reduce over-reliance on manufacturer data, providing neutral oversight. As aviation technology advances, retaining an appropriate level of human analysis and skepticism prevents safety from being compromised.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Halting Deliveries to Update Software and Manuals

With the 737 MAX grounded, deliveries of new aircraft were put on hold so Boeing could update critical software and documentation. While financially painful in the near-term, this pause was necessary for Boeing to implement vital fixes highlighted by crash investigations before the jet returns to service.

The decision to halt deliveries came amid scrutiny of MCAS, the automated flight control system that played a role in the two 737 MAX crashes. As delivered originally, the jet's flight manuals lacked specifics on MCAS, leaving pilots unaware of how it worked. Updates to manuals were clearly needed to provide detailed explanations of MCAS and associated procedures.

But enhancing manuals alone was insufficient - corresponding software updates were required as well. The initial MCAS design relied on input from just one of two angle of attack sensors, allowing a single faulty sensor to trigger excessive nose downs. To address this, Boeing developed a software revision using data from both sensors, adding redundancy.

The "no single point of failure" philosophy extends beyond MCAS to other flight control laws as well. Additional software tweaks reduce reliance on a sole sensor throughout the flight control system, with fault detection and accommodation capabilities added.

While Boeing could have continued delivering MAX jets without the software fix, keeping them grounded until updated was vital. It ensured airlines received aircraft with enhanced MCAS and important new safeguards already incorporated. Had airlines taken delivery of units needing later retrofits, additional downtime and complexity would've resulted.

Updating manuals also enabled Boeing to provide computer-based training modules explaining MCAS. By halting deliveries temporarily, these training materials could be completed so pilots were educated on the software fix before the first new MAX was delivered.

The delivery pause caused Boeing to stockpile completed but undeliverable jets in storage facilities. Cash flow took a hit as Boeing absorbed storage costs while awaiting regulatory approval to resume deliveries. But absorbing this near-term pain paved the way for a more permanent fix benefiting long-term safety and stability.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Communicating Transparently with Airlines and Regulators

Boeing’s historically cozy relationships with airlines and regulators have faced criticism amid MAX scrutiny. But openly engaging these stakeholders is pivotal for Boeing to rebuild trust. By communicating transparently about what went wrong and improvements underway, Boeing can demonstrate commitment to safety transcends commercial interests.

For airlines operating or awaiting the MAX, Boeing must provide transparent updates on the path to recertification. Carriers need visibility for scheduling and logistics planning. Boeing briefs airline pilots on software changes and training recommendations, soliciting feedback essential to finalizing improvements. Transparent dialogue around required fixes prevents misunderstandings down the road if further delays arise.

Boeing also engages with global regulators, like the FAA and EASA, as they review proposed modifications and new training protocols. Constant coordination ensures Boeing solutions satisfy regulator concerns, preventing cost and frustration from unanticipated certification obstacles. When additional questions arise during review, Boeing answers transparently rather than obscuring through technicalities.

Such constructive engagement stands in contrast to accusations of the past. Critics contend Boeing unduly influenced the original MAX certification, downplaying the significance of changes to secure streamlined approval as just another 737. Whether valid or not, the optics looked questionable.

Restoring confidence requires transparency even when uncomfortable. That means willingly disclosing internal issues like production pressures compromising safety-conscious culture. And admitting when financial objectives may have influenced important decisions improperly.

Boeing accepts blame for its role in the tragedies. Publicly acknowledging mistakes shows humility untypical of large corporations. But transparency when lives are lost builds trust in ways PR talking points never could.

How Boeing responds to various investigations will also impact perceptions. If questions arise around lobbying, executive compensation, or other ethically-gray areas, transparent cooperation demonstrates accountability matters more than avoiding embarrassment.

Settlements from civil litigation will garner close scrutiny as well. Boeing has already committed $2.5 billion to crash victim families. Settlements rightly provide compensation. Yet excessive opacity around terms can backfire by looking like hush money. If public funds support any deals, transparency around use becomes crucial.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Absorbing Financial Impacts of Delayed Orders and Shipments

The global grounding of the 737 MAX delivered a heavy financial blow to Boeing, with over 300 delivered jets barred from flying and 400-plus new aircraft stuck in storage awaiting delivery. With airline customers unable to utilize new planes, Boeing incurred substantial costs storing completed units while losing revenue from halted deliveries.

Absorbing these financial impacts severely strained Boeing’s cash flow and balance sheet. But rather than rush the MAX back into service, Boeing chose to endure short-term economic pain to prioritize regaining long-term trust and safety.

Storing delayed MAX deliveries cost Boeing around $1 billion per quarter by some estimates. Jets ready for customer handover piled up at Boeing facilities in Washington and Texas awaiting clearance to fly. Storage costs mounted daily given required maintenance, fuel, and insurance for each plane.

These storage fees hit as Boeing lost cash inflows from new deliveries, traditionally a major source of revenue. Boeing delivered just 380 aircraft in 2019 with the MAX grounded vs. 806 the year prior. Hundreds more deliveries were expected in 2020 before the pandemic added further delays.

The slowdown bled into Boeing’s supply chain too. Component manufacturers scaled back with fewer planes being completed. And Boeing paid suppliers to maintain readiness to ramp back up when deliveries resumed.

Despite pressures to cut corners and rush the MAX back into service, Boeing chose to endure short-term economic sacrifice. They recognized restoring public confidence in the 737 MAX’s safety mattered more than immediate cost relief.

Grounded: Boeing Puts Profits on Hold to Prioritize Air Safety Reviews - Earning Back Public Trust Through Safety Improvements

Earning back public trust after the 737 MAX tragedies is no small task, but Boeing seems committed to the long road ahead. Implementing incremental design tweaks and training upgrades helps, but cultivating an unwavering commitment to safety is what will truly demonstrate Boeing’s priorities have fundamentally shifted.

After initially downplaying the crashes as isolated events, Boeing leadership now acknowledges trust needs repairing. But sentiments won’t change overnight just because Boeing says so. “We know that trust has been damaged over the last few months and we own that and we are working hard to re-earn that trust,” said CEO Dennis Muilenburg. Re-earning trust requires concrete actions beyond verbal commitments.

Small software fixes may address MCAS and sensor issues implicated in the crashes. Mandatory simulator training better prepares pilots to handle emergencies. But an overarching culture that keeps profitability and scheduling from interfering with quality control matters most.

Critics have accused Boeing of prioritizing speedy MAX development, pressuring employees to avoid changes that might slow production or prompt costly pilot training requirements. A single-minded focus on shareholder returns at the expense of engineering rigor damages trust.

Restoring trust starts with empowering employees to delay timelines when needed for design iteration. Job security must not hinge on simply checking boxes faster. Boeing must also embrace external oversight, even if it slows the process. No more reflexive pushback when reviewers recommend design changes, but rather a collaborative approach to make improvements.

Most crucially, Boeing leadership must recognize safety advances sometimes require short-term profit sacrifices. Prioritizing returns above all else while expecting staff to also uphold quality is unrealistic. The tone set at the top impacts all.

Other manufacturers like Airbus deal with the same pressures yet avoid Boeing's pitfalls. The missing ingredient may be leadership truly committed to safety regardless of immediate business impact. Given the long order backlogs enjoyed, financial viability isn’t at stake. What’s needed most is cultural change.